Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship

2005

Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Impeachment
of Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative
Constitutional Perspective
Youngjae Lee
Fordham University School of Law, ylee@fordham.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Youngjae Lee, Law, Politics, and Impeachment: The Impeachment of Roh Moo-hyun from a Comparative Constitutional Perspective , 53 Am.
J. Comp. L. 403 (2005)
Available at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/448

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

YOUNGJAE LEE*

Law, Politics, and Impeachment:

The Impeachment of Roh Moo-hyun from a
Comparative Constitutional Perspective
In March 2004, the National Assembly of South Korea impeached PresidentRoh Moo-hyun and brought about an immediate suspension of Roh's presidency. Two months later,
the Constitutional Court of Korea restored the status quo by
dismissing the impeachment and reinstating the President.
This episode marks the first time in the history of modern
constitutionalismthat a president impeached by a legislative
body has been reinstated by a judicial body. This article focuses on one slice of this remarkable turn of events: its constitutional dimension from the perspective of comparative
constitutionallaw. After explainingthe constitutionalcourt's
decision, this article discusses the significance of the ruling
for three broad questions of comparative constitutional law:
judicial decisionmaking as a distinct form of constitutional
interpretation;the dual nature - legal and political - of the

impeachment process and the proper role of the courts in it;
and historical,political, and institutionalfactors that lead to
the doctrine of judicial supremacy.
INTRODUCTION

Thirty years ago, Charles Black, writing about impeachment in
the American context as Richard Nixon was facing a potential impeachment, considered the role of the judiciary in the presidential im* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I would like
to thank Jerry Cohen, Richard Fallon, Chaihark Hahm, Yasuo Hasebe, Sam Issacharoff, Benjamin Liebman, Larry Kramer, Thomas Lee, Julie Suk, Mark Tushnet,
Frank Upham, and the members of KANUL at NYU School of Law for their helpful
comments and conversations, and to Changwan Son for excellent research assistance.
Special thanks are due also to Dr. Chee Youn Hwang, Constitutional Research Officer
of the Constitutional Court of Korea, for helpful conversations about the Court. Except for the text of the South Korean Constitution and the Constitutional Court Act,
for which official English translations are available, all translations are my own. Korean words have been romanized according to the McCune-Reischauer system, except
for proper names of public figures and publications, in which case their own preferred
romanization has been used.
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peachment process.' Black imagined a situation in which the House
impeaches the President and the Senate convicts, but then the Supreme Court steps in, vacates the conviction, and "putsthe impeached
and convicted president back in for the rest of his term," and "we all
live happily ever after."2 Black's take on the scenario was unequivocal. "I don't think I possess the resources of rhetoric adequate to
characterizing the absurdity of that position,"3 he wrote, calling the
result "preposterous"4 and asking "[w]ith what aura of legitimacy
would a thus-reinstated chief magistrate be surrounded?" 5 Black
concluded that when it comes to presidential impeachment, the only
rule that "matter[s]" is that "the courts have, in this, no part at all to
6
play."
Now consider what happened between March 12 and May 14,
2004, in South Korea. 7 During that period, Koreans experienced a
series of events that resembled the scenario that Black described and
derided. On March 12, for the first time in Korean history, the National Assembly of Korea passed a motion to impeach the President,
which led to an immediate suspension of Roh Moo-hyun's presidency.8 On May 14, after a period of much uncertainty and turmoil
in Korean politics-with the usually powerless Prime Minister temporarily assuming the office of the presidency 9-the Constitutional
Court of Korea put an end to the saga by rejecting the impeachment
motion and reinstating the President.' 0 Koreans then all lived happily ever after. Or, at least according to one poll, 84 percent of the
Korean population approved the Constitutional Court's decision."
In American constitutional thinking, the view that the judiciary's
role in the presidential impeachment process should be limited dates
back to the Founders. Alexander Hamilton argued in the Federalist
Papers that the Supreme Court should not be endowed with the
1. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 53-64 (1974).
2. Id. at 54 (emphasis in original).

3. Id.
4. Id. at 55.
5. Id.at 54.
6. Id. at 63.
7. In this article, both "South Korea" and "Korea" refer to the Republic of Korea.
8. Samuel Len, South Korean Parliament Votes to Strip President of Powers,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2004.
9. TAEHANMIN'GUK HONBOP [HONBOP] [Constitution] art. 86; 89Hun-Ma221 (Apr.
28, 1994); see also Jeong-ho Roh, Crafting and Consolidating Constitutional Democracy in Korea, in KOREA'S DEMOCRATIZATION 191-93 (Samuel S. Kim ed., 2003).
10. James Brooke, ConstitutionalCourt ReinstatesSouth Korea'sImpeached President, N.Y. TIMES, May 14,. 2004; Anthony Faiola, Court Rejects S. Korean President's
Impeachment, WASH. POST, May 14, 2004; Barbara Demick, South Korean President

Is Reinstated: A Court Rules That His Impeachment Was Unjustified. Meanwhile,
New National Assembly Is Set to Take Office, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 2004.
11. Im S6k-kyu & Yi Hwa-ju, H6njae Kigak Kyalchang "Charhaeta"84% [84% Ap-

prove the Constitutional Court's Dismissal], HANKYOREH, May 14, 2004; see also Citizens, Civic Groups Welcome Ruling ReinstatingRoh, KOREA TIMES, May 15, 2004.
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power to determine impeachments. 12 He doubted "whether the members of that tribunal would at all times be endowed with so eminent a
portion of fortitude, as would be called for in the execution of so difficult a task" and whether "they would possess the degree of credit and
authority, which might, on certain occasions, be indispensable towards reconciling the people to a decision that should happen to clash
3
with an accusation brought by their immediate representatives.'
Hamilton added, "The awful discretion which a court of impeachments must necessarily have, to doom to honor or to infamy the most
confidential and the most distinguished characters of the community,
14
forbids the commitment of the trust to a small number of persons."
The U.S. Supreme Court sounded a similar note in its 1993 case,
Nixon v. United States, in which the Court was asked by former
Judge Walter Nixon to review the Senate's impeachment trial that
led to his removal from office.1 5 Nixon argued that the Senate failed
to discharge its duty under the Constitution to "try all Impeachments"' 6 by delegating factfinding to a committee.' 7 The Court declined to rule on the merits, holding that the meaning of the word
"try" in the Constitution's Impeachment Trial Clause was a nonjusticiable political question, there being "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department" and "a lack of judicially discovereable and manageable
standards for resolving it."18
American constitutional scholars are nearly unanimous on this
issue. As one recently summarized, "commentators frequently cite
impeachment as the prototypical example of a political question, if
one is to be found at all," 19 and the recent impeachment and trial of
Bill Clinton, according to another, "reinforced the presumption that
most scholars accept-that the only role the judiciary has in the impeachment of a President is the role played by the Chief Justice as
presiding officer" and that "Ij]udicial review is likely to be limited at
12. THE
1961).

FEDERALIST

No. 65, at 441 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,

13. Id.

14. Id. at 441-42.
15. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
17. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228.
18. Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
19. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court?:The Fall of the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine and the Rise of JudicialSupremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 272 (2002)
(citing Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the GuaranteeClause Should Be Justiciable,
65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849, 855 (1994)); Michael J. Gerhardt, RediscoveringNonjusticiability: Judicial Review of Impeachments After Nixon, 44 DuKE L.J. 231, 244 (1994);
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciabilityand Separation of Powers: A Neo-FederalistApproach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 424 (1996); Ronald D. Rotunda, An Essay on the
Constitutional Parametersof Federal Impeachment, 76 Ky. L.J. 707, 728-32 (1987/
1988).

406

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 53

best."20 Judge Richard Posner, going further, thinks that "it is clear
as a matter of political theory," and not only as "a matter of law," why
the role of the judiciary
should be limited in the presidential im21
peachment context.
For comparative constitutional scholars, then, the Roh impeachment episode in Korea raises a rich set of questions. To be sure, it
should be observed at the outset that some of the differences between
American and Korean contexts are easy to explain. The two governments are organized differently from each other, and the impeachment processes in the two constitutions have structural differences.
For one thing, the Korean Constitution explicitly gives the Constitutional Court jurisdiction over impeachment questions; 22 the American Constitution does not. The National Assembly is a unicameral
legislature; 23 the American system contemplates impeachment in the
House of Representatives and trial in the Senate. 2 4 One can thus
draw a rough analogy between the Korean system in which the legislature impeaches and then the Constitutional Court convicts to the
U.S. process in which the House impeaches and then the Senate convicts. Finally, given that the impeachment move was highly unpopular in Korea, some of the concerns that Charles Black raised about
the legitimacy of a president reinstated after being impeached do not
seem to readily apply.
At the same time, the two contexts are not so different as to
make comparisons pointless or silly, as similar constitutional issues
are at stake. The Constitutional Court of Korea, consisting of justices
who are appointed, 25 was acting as the final arbiter of a heated political conflict between democratically elected legislators and a democratically elected president. Some of the factors that point American
academics in the direction of the view that impeachment is nonjusticiable-for example, that impeachment is an inherently political process and that courts lack "judicially discoverable and manageable
standards" 2 6 to resolve impeachment disputes 2 7 -are present in the
Korean context as well. In addition, the general question of what
kind of conduct by the president should constitute grounds for im20. Susan Low Bloch, A Report Card on the Impeachment: Judging the Institutions That Judged President Clinton, 63 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 166 (2000).
21. RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT,
AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 130 (1999).
22. HONBOP art. 111 & art. 113.
23. Id. art. 41.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 & art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
25. HONBOP art. 111.
26. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
27. See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 19, at 256-57; Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative
Career Resolution: An Essay on the Removal of FederalJudges, 76 Ky.L.J. 643, 67377 (1987/1988); Rotunda, supra note 19, at 728-32.
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peachment is an issue that has come up repeatedly in the U.S.28
Thus, although the context is different, the set of questions is familiar and important.
The significance of the Roh impeachment saga goes beyond the
confines of the U.S.-Korea comparisons. First, the Korean Constitution is not unique among constitutions in explicitly designating a judicial body as the final arbiter of impeachment disputes. 2 9 For
instance, in Germany, in order to remove the Federal President, the
Bundestag or the Bundesrat must bring a motion to impeach to the
Federal Constitutional Court. 30 The impeachment process in Hungary is similar; the parliament can initiate impeachment proceedings
against the President but the final authority to remove the President
lies in the Constitutional Court. 3 l In the Czech Republic, too, the
senate can remove the President only by charging him for high treason at the constitutional court. 32 The Roh impeachment case is notable, then, for marking the first time in modem constitutional history
in which a common constitutional mechanism for removal of a president has produced a situation in which a president
impeached by a
33
legislature has been reinstated by a judicial body.
Second, the Korean example may be studied as part of the global
trend towards what Ran Hirschl has recently called the "constitutionalization and the judicialization of mega-politics." 3 4 In the past two
decades, Hirschl and others have noted, judicial bodies around the
world have come to assume increasingly important roles in resolving
some of the most fundamental political conflicts that countries face. 3 5
28. See, e.g., Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.

(1998); RAOUL

BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

(Enlarged ed.

1974); BLACK, supra note 1; MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2000); POSNER, supra note
21; KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); Ronald Dworkin, The Wounded Constitution, N.Y.
REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 18, 1999; Keith E. Whittington, "High Crimes" After Clinton:
Deciding What's Impeachable, POL'Y REV., Feb. & Mar. 2000.
29. See Naoko Kada, Comparative ConstitutionalImpeachment: Conclusions, in
CHECKING EXECUTIVE POWER: PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPEC-

TIVE 137, 139-42 (Jody C. Baumgartner & Naoko Kada eds., 2003).

30. GRUNDGESETZ art. 61.
31. A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA art. 31.
32. USTAVNI ZAKON CESK2 REPUBLIKY art. 65. Other countries with similar systems include Albania, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Croatia, El Salvador, Honduras,
and Nicaragua. See Kada, supra note 29, at 141-42.
33. The closest analogue is the decision by the supreme court in the Philippines
finding that the impeachment of the chief justice of the supreme court was unconstitutional on procedural grounds. Roel Landingin, Impeachment Move on Philippine
Judge Ruled Unlawful by Court, FINANCIAL TIMES (Japan Edition), Nov. 11, 2003.
34. RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF

169 (2004).
35. See id. at 169-210; Ran Hirschl, Resituating the Judicializationof Politics:
Bush v. Gore as a Global Trend, 15 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 191 (2002); Sam Issacharoff, ConstitutionalizingDemocracy in FracturedSocieties, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1861,
THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM
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The most salient example for the American audience is Bush v.
Gore,36 of course, but there are many other instances, such as the
judicialization of the question of "Who is a Jew?" and the meaning of
a "Jewish state" in Israel, 37 the role of the Supreme Court of Canada
in addressing the question of Quebec's secession from Canada, 38 and
the South African Constitutional Court's active role in the constitution drafting process through the Court's use of its power not to cer39
tify proposed constitutions.
These are large, complex issues, which are mentioned here only
to present a global constitutional backdrop against which to view the
Roh impeachment case. The scope of this article is more limited. Its
aim is to explain the political and legal context in which the Roh impeachment and reinstatement took place, present and analyze the
Court's opinion dismissing the impeachment, and situate the impeachment saga in a broader comparative constitutional context.
Part I introduces the major political players and describes events
that led to the impeachment. Part II gives some basic facts about the
institutional features of the Constitutional Court of Korea and discusses the Constitutional Court's ruling. Part III identifies and suggests three significant constitutional themes of the ruling: judicial
decisionmaking as a distinct mode of constitutional interpretation;
the Court's management of the dual nature-legal and political-of
the impeachment process; and the causes behind the doctrine of judicial supremacy in Korea and its role in establishing the rule of law.
I.

POLITICAL CONTEXT

Roh Moo-hyun was elected president through a direct popular
vote in December 2002. A former human rights lawyer without a college degree, he came to the presidency-which is limited to a single,
five-year term under the Korean Constitution 4 0-with a compelling
personal story and a progressive reformist agenda. 4 ' However, his
1865 (2004); Russell A. Miller, Lords of Democracy: The Judicializationof "PurePolitics" in the United States and Germany, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 587 (2004); Richard
H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-Foreword: The Constitutionalizationof
Democratic Politics, 118 HARv. L. REV. 29, 31-34 (2004); see generally THE GLOBAL
EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (C. Neal Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder eds., 1995).
36. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). For an argument that Bush v. Gore raised compelling
political question concerns, see Barkow, supra note 19, at 242-43; Steven G. Calabresi, A Political Question, in BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 129, 13842 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002); Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, in THE
VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 55, 56-76 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard
A. Epstein eds., 2001).
37. HIRSCHL, supra note 34, at 173-78.
38. Id. at 178-82.
39. Id. at 184-86. Hirschl mentions more examples from New Zealand, Germany,
Russia, Hungary, Turkey, Fiji, and Pakistan. Id. at 209.
40. HONBOP art. 70.
41. See, e.g., Barbara Demick, A "Lincoln" Climbs to Top in Elitist Korea, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at 26.
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presidency faced a difficult political landscape from his inauguration
in February 2003. The rival, conservative opposition Grand National
Party (GNP) had the majority in the National Assembly, 4 2 the unicameral legislative branch in Korea, 4 3 and Roh's own party, the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), was paralyzed by a generational
rift between those who rose to power under the previous president
Kim Dae-jung and a younger generation of legislators who identified
themselves more with Roh. 4 4 The division within the MDP meant
that Roh was not always able to count on the MDP's support in the
Assembly, and his support base became even more fragile when the
pro-Roh forces left the MDP to form a new party, the Uri Party, in
September.

45

Once the Uri Party members defected, the MDP turned squarely
against Roh, forming an anti-Roh alliance with the GNP. The GNP,
holding 149 seats, and the MDP, holding 63 seats, formed a
supermajority in the National Assembly of 272 members. 4 6 Under
the Korean Constitution, a vote of two thirds or more of the National
Assembly is sufficient to override the President's vetoes on legisla48
impeach the President, 49
tion, 47 expel members of the Assembly,

and propose constitutional amendments to be put to national referenda. 50 Therefore, Roh had to manage the weak economy, relations
with North Korea, and the strained alliance with the United States
51
while facing a hostile and powerful legislative body.
In October 2003, Roh's difficult job became even more difficult, as
some of his closest aides were arrested for accepting illegal campaign
contributions for Roh's 2002 presidential campaign. 52 Finding himself in the middle of a political crisis with few allies in the Assembly
42. Kim Hyung-jin, Assembly Opens Special Session: Lawmakers to Focus on Confirmation Hearing, Payoff Flap, KOREA HERALD, Feb. 5, 2003.
43. HONBOP chap. III.
44. Hwang Jang-jin, Post-Election Crisis Deepens in Ruling Party:Roh Supporters, Old Guards Face Off Over Creation of New Party, KOREA HERALD, Apr. 30, 2003.
45. Lee Joo-hee, Ruling Party Splits Today: About 40 Pro-Roh Lawmakers to
Form New Party, KOREA HERALD, Sept. 20, 2003; New Party Changes Name to "Uri
Party," KOREA TIMES, Oct. 24, 2003.
46. GNP Flexes Muscle, MDP Reorganizes, KOREA HERALD, Sept. 29, 2003.
47. HONBOP art. 53, § 4.
48. Id. art. 64, § 3.
49. Id. art. 65, § 2.
50. Id. art. 130, § 1.
51. See, e.g., Expecting Trouble?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 2003; John Burton, S Korea Caught Between Two-Forces: the President-Electis Under Pressurefrom Both the
US and North Korea, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at 6; Andrew Ward, Paralysis
Feared as Lawmakers Snub Roh, FINANCIAL TIMES (Japan edition), Sept. 27, 2003, at

1.
52. Anthony Faiola, Crisis Widens for S. Korea Leader: Aides' Arrest in Bribery
Scandal is Latest in Roh's Brief Tenure, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2003, at A21; Roh's
Former Top Aide Arrested, KOREA TIMES, Oct. 16, 2003; Kim Kyung-ho, Roh's Aide
Faces Arrest on Bribery Charges, KOREA HERALD, Oct. 16, 2003.
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and plummeting job approval ratings, 5 3 and anticipating the upcoming General Election in April, Roh made a series of moves to reassert
his authority and lay the groundwork for a fresh mandate after the
April election. First, in October, he proposed a national referendum
to ascertain the nation's confidence in his leadership. 5 4 Second, in response to the campaign contribution scandal, he promised to resign if
the amount of illegal contributions his 2002 presidential campaign
accepted exceeded one-tenth the amount of illegal contributions the
opposing GNP accepted for the same election. 55 Third, he made no
secret of his view that his political fortunes were directly aligned with
the performance of the Uri Party at the April election. Although he
had not formally joined the party, he made his preferences clear, even
suggesting that he may quit if the Uri Party did not make a strong
56
showing at the election.
The opposition parties GNP and MDP fiercely criticized every
one of these moves by Roh and repeatedly made threats to impeach
Roh for these steps and others that Roh had taken. In fact, calls for
impeachment were made so frequently-starting in April 200357-

that it at times appeared that the opposition parties, realizing that
they potentially had the votes needed to remove the President they
53. Barbara Demick, Even Supporters Complain About S. Korean Leader: Roh is
Criticized for Leaving the Party and Other Erratic Moves, and His Ratings Have
Plunged, L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 2003, at 3.
54. Anthony Faiola, S. Korean President Calls for Vote: Roh Offers to Quit If Referendum Goes Against Him, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2003, at A16.
55. Sim Sung-tae, Roh Takes Another Political Gamble: President May Resign If
Campaign Spent Over 10% of GNP Funds, KOREA HERALD, Dec. 15, 2003.
56. President's Gamble Aims for Election Jackpot in April, KOREA TIMES, Jan. 9,
2004.
57. In April 2003, there was a dispute between Roh and the Assembly over Roh's
choice of Ko Young-koo to head the National Intelligence Service, and some members
of the National Assembly mentioned impeachment as an option. See Hwang Jang-jin,
NIS Chief Controversy Grows, KOREA HERALD, Apr. 28, 2003. In June 2003, the GNP
adopted a resolution to impeach Roh if he did not apologize for his remark during his
visit to Japan that a full democracy cannot be achieved in Korea until the Communist
Party is legalized in Korea. Opposition Threatens to Impeach President, KOREA
TIMES, Jun. 13, 2003. Then, from September 2003 until Roh was in fact impeached in
March 2004, the GNP and MDP came up with a different reason to impeach Roh
every month. In September 2003, the Assembly passed a bill to dismiss the Government Administration and Home Affairs Minister Kim Doo-kwan, and the GNP again
mentioned that it would consider pushing for impeachment if Roh vetoed the bill. See
Roh Faces All-Out War With Opposition Party, KOREA TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003. In October, with the campaign contribution scandal brewing, the GNP warned that it would
attempt to impeach Roh if he turned out to have been personally involved in accepting
the illegal contributions. See Joo Sang-min, GNP Threatens Impeachment: Opposition Calls for Thorough Probeof Scandal, KOREA HERALD, Oct. 15, 2003. Also in October, the GNP opposed Roh's December referendum proposal and threatened to
impeach if he continued to seek the referendum. See Lee Joo-hee, Politics Rumble
and Tumble Over Referendum, KOREA HERALD, Oct. 20, 2003. And in November, the
GNP again threatened to impeach Roh if Roh vetoed the bill passed by the Assembly
authorizing the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate the campaign contribution scandal focusing on Roh's aides. See Joo Sang-min, Opposition Threatens
Impeachment, KOREA HERALD, Nov. 25, 2003.
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did not like, did not hesitate before flexing their muscles at every
turn. They also appeared to be mindful of the fact that the strength
of their alliance, based on their common dislike of Roh, was not going
to last forever, given the upcoming elections in April.
After a quick turn of events in February and March, the opposition parties successfully passed a motion to impeach Roh. On February 24, at a press conference, the President urged voters to support
the Uri Party at the April elections. 58 He again made clear his intention to tie the fate of his presidency to the election, stating that he
"wanted to do everything that was legally permitted to help the Uri
Party."5 9 On February 28, the MDP, alleging that Roh's comments
amounted to a violation of the election
law, filed a complaint with the
60
National Election Commission.
On March 3, the Commission dispatched a letter to Roh requesting that he, as a public official, remain neutral in the upcoming elections.6 1 Although the Commission was (rather inexplicably) vague in
its letter to the President about whether he had actually broken any
law, its letter to the complainant, the MDP, explicitly stated that the
President had violated his duty to maintain his neutrality in elections. 6 2 The opposition parties swiftly demanded an apology from
Roh and threatened to impeach him.6 3 In response, Roh held a press

conference on March 11. Although he apologized for the various
scandals involving his close aides, he refused to apologize for the remarks he made in support of the Uri Party. Instead, he stated that
he substantively disagreed with the Commission's view that his sup64
port for the Uri Party was in violation of law.

The opposition parties responded to Roh's showing of defiance by
passing a motion to impeach Roh. The motion listed 21 separate
counts as grounds for impeachment, ranging from Roh's support of
the Uri Party to corruption scandals involving Roh's close aides to
Roh's management of the economy. 6 5 Under the Constitution, a mo58. Roh Calls on Nation to Support Pro-GovernmentParty, KOREA

TIMES,

Feb. 25,

2004.

59. 2004Hun-Nal.
60. Joo Sang-min, MDP Takes Roh and Uri Leader to Election Watchdog, KOREA
HERALD, Mar. 1, 2004. The Commission is a constitutionally established body that
monitors elections and campaign activities and is composed of nine members, three of
whom are appointed by the president, three chosen by the Assembly, and three chosen by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Korea. HoNBoP art. 114.
61. Letter from the National Election Commission to President (Mar. 3, 2004) (on
file with author).
62. Letter from the National Election Commission to Millennium Democratic
Party (Mar. 4, 2004) (on file with author).
63. Joo Sang-min, PartiesDemand Roh Apology for Violating Election Law: Opposition Threatens Impeachment If Demand Is Not Met, KOREA HERALD, Mar. 5, 2004.
64. Seo Hyun-jin, Poll Results Will Decide My Fate: Roh; PresidentRejects Rivals'
Demand to Apologize for Violating Elections Law, KOREA HERALD, Mar. 12, 2004.
65. Taet'ongny6ng (Roh Moo-hyun) T'anhaek Soch'utiky6ls5 [Motion for Impeachment of President Roh Moo-hyun], Mar. 12, 2004.
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tion for impeachment requires the votes of two-thirds or more of the
total members of the Assembly to pass. 66 Out of 272 members in the
Assembly, 193 voted in favor of the motion and two voted against it,
while all 47 Uri Party members in the Assembly protested the vote
and did not participate in it.67
The impeachment vote threw the country into a state of turmoil.
As provided by the Constitution, Roh's presidency was immediately
suspended, and the Prime Minster, traditionally powerless, assumed
the duties of the office of the presidency. In the meantime, the impeachment was highly unpopular politically, with the polls indicating
that seven out of ten Korean citizens were against the impeachment,
and there were demonstrations nationwide protesting the National
Assembly's actions. 68 Under the Constitution, the institution that
had the responsibility to resolve this political dispute was the Constitutional Court. As the Constitutional Court deliberated, the impeachment vote became a campaign issue in the General Elections,
and, in a result that was widely assumed to have been influenced by
the unpopularity of the impeachment, the Uri Party gained a majority, with 152 out of the 299 Assembly seats, while the GNP won 121
seats and the MDP ended up with merely nine seats. 6 9 The Constitutional Court's decision rejecting the impeachment motion followed a
month later.
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S DECISION

The Constitutional Court of Korea is a specialized body that is
charged with adjudicating constitutional matters.7 0 Largely modeled
66.

HONBOP art. 65, § 2.

67. Park Song-wu, National Assembly Impeaches President Roh, KOREA TIMES,
Mar. 12, 2004.
68. Samuel Len, President'sImpeachment Stirs Angry Protests in South Korea,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2004; Ryu Jin, 7 Out of 10 Oppose Impeachment, KOREA TIMES,
Mar. 13, 2004.
69. Anthony Faiola, Korean Vote Shifts Power in Assembly: Turnover May Aid
Impeached President, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2004, at A14; James Brooke, South Korea's Impeached President Gains Support in Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2004, at A6;
Barbara Demick, Supporters of S. Korea's Roh Push Legislature to Left: The Election
Results are Seen as Response to Conservative Lawmakers' Vote Last Month to Impeach
the President,L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2004, at A3; Lee Joo-hee, Crushed MDP on Uncertain Path, KOREA HERALD, Apr. 17, 2004.
70. See generally TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 213-17
(2003); Chaihark Hahm, Law, Culture, and the Politics of Confucianism, 16 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 253, 260-65 (2003); James M. West & Edward J. Baker, The 1987 Constitutional Reforms in South Korea: Electoral Process and Judicial Independence, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN KOREA: HISTORICAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 221, 241-44 (William
Shaw ed., 1991). Because the Constitutional Court remains separate from the rest of
the judiciary, its relationship to the Korean Supreme Court has at times been, and
remains, uneasy and uncertain. See, e.g., GINSBURG, supra, at 239-42; Hahm, supra,
at 264.
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on the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, 7 1 the Court was established in 1987, as part of the constitutional amendments of 1987.
The 1987 amendments themselves were ratified by the National Assembly as part of the country's democratization process and emergence from its military dictatorships of the seventies and the
eighties. 72 The Court consists of nine justices. Although all nine justices are "appointed" by the President according to the Constitution,
the Constitution also provides that three of the nine appointed by the
President are to be selected by the National Assembly, and the remaining three appointees are to be designated by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court. 73 Each justice serves for a six-year term, which
is renewable. 7 4 The Court has jurisdiction over five areas: 1) review
of constitutionality of statutes, 2) impeachments, 3) dissolution of poamong governmental bodies,
litical parties, 4) jurisdictional 7disputes
5
and 5) constitutional petitions.
The Constitution provides that "[i]n case the President ... ha[s]
violated the Constitution or other Acts in the performance of official
duties, the National Assembly may pass motions for their impeachment." 76 Other than this requirement of violation of "the Constitution or other Acts," the text of the Constitution is silent on what is
impeachable and what isn't. In order for the Court to affirm the National Assembly's vote to impeach, six out of the nine justices must
vote in favor of removal. 77 If the Court so rules, an election to select a
new president must take place within sixty days. 78 Under the Constitutional Court Act, the Court must hold oral arguments in adjudicating impeachments 79 and abide by "the laws and regulations
relating to the criminal litigation mutatis mutandis" during the proceedings.8 0 The National Assembly's position was, as required by the
Constitutional Court Act, represented by the Chair of the Legislation

71. For comparisons to the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, see GINSsupra note 70, at 218; Chaihark Hahm, Rule of Law in South Korea: Rhetoric
and Implementation, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAw 385, 389 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004); see also DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 10-15 (1997); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 27-30 (1994).
72. GINSBURG, supra note 70, at 218; Hahm, supra note 71, at 389; West & Baker,
supra note 70, at 241-44.
73. HONBOP art. 111.
74. Id. art. 112. Although the terms are renewable, Constitutional Court justices
have rarely sought renewal and generally serve only for one term.
75. Id.
76. Id. art. 65, § 1.
77. Id. art. 113, § 1.
78. Id. art. 68, § 1.
79. H6nb6p Chaep'anso P6p [Constitutional Court Act] art. 30, § 1 (1988).
80. Id. art. 40, § 1.
BURG,
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and Justice Committee of the Assembly, 8 ' whereas Roh retained pri82
vate counsel.
The National Assembly organized the alleged instances of impeachable misconduct by Roh under three headings: Disturbance of
the Rule of Law, Corruption and Abuse of Power, and Maladministration.8 3 Under the first heading, the National Assembly had two chief
complaints. First, it alleged that Roh's open support for the Uri
Party for the General Election was in violation of the election law
provisions that require public officials to be politically neutral and to
refrain from influencing outcomes of elections.8 4 Second, it alleged
that Roh showed contempt for the Constitution and constitutionally
established bodies by questioning the National Election Commission's ruling that he was in violation of the requirement of political
neutrality and by seeking a national referendum to gauge the citizens' confidence in his leadership.8 5 The second heading, Corruption
and Abuse of Power, alleged that Roh and his close aides accepted
bribes and illegal campaign contributions.8 6 The third heading, Maladministration, accused Roh of neglecting his duties, lacking direction, and generating an uncertain political and economic
87
environment.
After holding seven bench trial-like hearings starting on March
30 and ending on April 30,88 the Court announced its decision rejecting the National Assembly's motion and reinstating Roh on May
14.89 The Court's decision had two parts. First, it addressed the
question of whether alleged instances of misconduct by Roh, as described in the National Assembly's motion to impeach, "violated the
Constitution or other Acts." 90 Then, the Court considered whether
the violations were serious enough to warrant his removal from
office.
81. Id. art. 49, § 1.
82. Shim Jae-yun, Big Guns to Join Roh's Defense Team, KOREA TIMES, Mar. 16,
2004.
83. Taet'ongny6ng (Roh Moo-hyun) T'anhaek Soch'udiky6ls6 [Motion for Impeach-

ment of President Roh Moo-hyun], Mar. 12, 2004.
84. Id.

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Kim So-young, Court Ends Roh Hearings, To Rule in Mid-May, KOREA HERALD, May 1, 2004; Na Jeong-ju, Court Seeks Fast Impeachment Ruling, KOREA TIMES,
Mar. 30, 2004.
89. 2004 HunNa 1 (May 14, 2004). The Court's opinion was per curiam, and the
Court did not disclose the final vote breakdown. Instead, the Court released a statement announcing that it would not reveal individual justices' votes and that no dissenting opinion would be released. Taet'ongny6ng T'anhaek Sag6nai Ky6lch6ngmune
H6nb6p Chaep'ansoai tfigy6nmanal Kijaehan Iyu [The Reason the Court Released
Only the Court's Opinion in the Presidential Impeachment Decision], May 14, 2004.
90. HONBOP art. 65, § 1.
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The Court found that Roh was in violation of law in three instances. First, the Court held, Roh violated the law mandating neutrality of public officials by openly advocating for the Uri Party.
Second, Roh violated his duty to observe the Constitution by challenging the validity of the election law that he was found to be in
violation of by the National Election Commission. Third, Roh violated his duty to observe the Constitution by proposing a national
referendum without a constitutional basis. The Court then ruled
that none of these violations were serious enough to justify removing
him from office. 9 1
A.

What Laws Did Roh Violate?
1. Political Neutrality Requirement

The National Assembly claimed that Roh violated the law requiring public officials to be politically neutral. Election for Public Office
and Election Malpractice Prevention Act ("the Act"), Article 9 provides that "[p1ublic officials and others who must remain politically
neutral shall not improperly influence elections or otherwise engage
in behaviors that would influence election results."9 2 The facts were
not in dispute. Roh stated at one of the press conferences that "there
is no telling what will happen" if the Uri Party does not win at least
one-third of the seats in the Assembly in April and that he "would be
at a loss as to how to manage the country if the Uri Party ends up a
minority party. '9 3 He said that he hoped the citizens would support
91. 2004Hun-Nal (May 14, 2004). Roh raised various procedural objections to the
impeachment, but the Court rejected these challenges, stating that proper procedures
were followed. 2004HunNal, at 11-15.
92. Kongjiks6n'g6mit S6n'g6buj6ng Pangjib6p [Election for Public Office and Election Malpractice Prevention Act], art. 9. The Court explained that this provision was
an implementation of the constitutional requirement of political neutrality derived
from Article 7, Section 1, Article 41, Article 67, and Article 116 of the Constitution.
First, Article 7, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that "[aill public officials shall
be servants of the entire people and shall be responsible to the people." HONBOP art.
7, § 1. The Court explained that implicit in this provision is the requirement that
public officials serve the interests of the public and not just particular parties or organizations and that public officials must not use their office to influence the outcomes
of competitions among different political groups. 2004Hun-Nal, at 19. Second, Article 41, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he National Assembly shall be
composed of members elected by universal, equal, direct and secret ballot by the citizens," and Article 67, Section 1 provides that "[tihe President shall be elected by universal, equal, direct and secret ballot by the people." HONBOP art. 41, § 1 & art. 67,
§ 1. The Court noted that in order for these elections to take place without improper
influence, public officials must remain neutral. 2004Hun-Nal, at 19. Finally, Article
8, Section 1 guarantees "the plural party system" and free "establishment of political
parties," Article 11 provides that "[aill citizens shall be equal before the law," and
Article 116, Section 1 provides that "[elqual opportunity shall be guaranteed" during
"[e]lection campaigns." HONBboP art. 8, § 1, art. 11 & art. 116, §1. These provisions
also require, the Court explained, that public officials remain politically neutral.
2004Hun-Nal, at 20.
93. 2004Hun-Nal, at 2.
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the Uri Party at the election and that "he wanted to do everything
that was legally permitted to help the Uri Party."9 4 He also said
that, at the General Election, the voters would be deciding whether to
allow the President they themselves elected to serve as an effective
95
president or whether to let him be driven out by the opposition.
The Constitutional Court agreed with the National Assembly
that these statements were in violation of the President's legal duty
to be politically neutral. The Court reasoned that his conduct was
undesirable for the country's democratic process because he was interfering with the voters' opinion formation and was thwarting the
candidates' own efforts to win the voters' confidence. The rules of the
process dictate that the candidates compete against each other fairly
and on the basis of merits of the candidates themselves and the policies they promote, and if the President is allowed to support one side
or another and influence the voters, the Court explained, the basic
logic of the competitive democratic process is undermined. 9 6 In this
instance, the Court pointed out, because Roh actively expressed his
support for a particular party and urged the voters to do the same, he
improperly used the political weight of his position to influence the
outcome of the election. The Court concluded that such conduct by
Roh was incompatible with his constitutional duty to be a "servant[ ]
of the entire people and... be responsible to the people" 9 7 and was in
violation of his duty of political neutrality. 98
2.

Respect for the Constitution and Constitutional Bodies

The National Assembly alleged that Roh showed contempt for
the Constitution and constitutional bodies by questioning the National Election Commission's ruling that he was in violation of the
requirement of political neutrality and by seeking an illegal national
referendum. 9 9 The Constitutional Court agreed with the National
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 25-27.
97. HONBOp art. 7, § 1.
98. 2004Hun-Nal, at 26. The Court's interpretation of the law and the wisdom of
applying the law to the president were by no means uncontroversial. Indeed, by the
U.S. standards, prohibiting the president from supporting his party appears overly
restrictive. Roh apparently felt the same way, as he cited an episode of the popular
television drama West Wing, in which Martin Sheen's character campaigns for a candidate from his party, to argue that "[tihe President is a politician" and should be
allowed to be partisan. Roh Likens Crisis to "West Wing," KOREA TIMES, Mar. 12,
2004. Scholars in Korea actively debated this issue as the impeachment proceedings
took place. See, e.g., Reuben Staines, PresidentialPoliticalNeutrality Central Issue in
Impeachment Trial, KOREA TIMES, Mar. 28, 2004. Roh's lawyers (ultimately unsuccessfully) argued that the law in question did not apply to the President and that, if it
did apply, it was unconstitutional. Tappy6ns6 (3) [Brief for Respondent No. 3] at 5-30
(2004Hun-Na 1). Part III discusses why such restrictions on campaigning by the president may be perceived to be necessary in Korea. See infra Part III.
99. 2004Hun-Nal, at 3-4.
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Assembly and found Roh to be in violation of his constitutional duty
to uphold the Constitution. 10 0
The Court scrutinized the way in which Roh reacted to the National Election Commission's decision that Roh's comments in support of a specific party were in violation of the election law. Through
his press secretary, Roh had stated that "it should be made clear that
the National Election Commission's decision is difficult to comprehend," that "it is time for us to change our system and custom in a
way that is more suited to a developed democratic society like ours,"
that "election laws that accompanied our past presidents' authoritarian institutions should be reformed and updated," and that "interpretation and enforcement of election laws must be revised to reflect
the current changes from the past's authoritarian culture."' 0 ' In
short, the Court concluded, Roh's view was that the election law he
was found to have violated was, in his words, "a relic from our dicta02
torial past.'
The Court held that for the President to issue a public statement
challenging the legality and legitimacy of an existing law cannot be
3
squared with his duty to observe and uphold the Constitution. 0 If
the President doubts the constitutionality of a law properly enacted
by the National Assembly, the Court stated, he should attempt to revise the law by introducing a reform bill to the National Assembly
instead of questioning the law that he was found to have violated. 10 4
The Court further added that the President had to be a role model for
all public servants, and his disrespect for the law could have an adverse effect on the willingness of public officials and citizens to obey
the law and thus harm the country and its constitutional order.' 0 5
3.

National Referendum

The Court also took issue with Roh's proposal for a referendum
to determine the country's confidence in his leadership. Article 72 of
100. The Constitutional Court derived Roh's duty to uphold the Constitution from
two constitutional provisions, Article 66 and Article 69. 2004Hun-Nal, at 35-36. Article 66, Section 2 of the Constitution provides, "The President shall have the responsibility and duty to safeguard the independence, territorial integrity and continuity of
the State and the Constitution." HONBOp art. 66, § 2. Article 69 provides, "The President, at the time of his inauguration, shall take the following oath: 'I do solemnly
swear before the people that I will faithfully execute the duties of the President by
observing the Constitution, defending the State, pursuing the peaceful unification of
the homeland, promoting the freedom and welfare of the people and endeavoring to
develop national culture."' Id. art. 69.
101. 2004Hun-Nal, at 34-35.
102. Id. at 34.
103. Id. at 35.
104. Id. at 36.
105. Id. The Court's ruling here, too, appears overly restrictive, at least by the
U.S. standards. Part III discusses why there might be such sensitivity on the relationship between the president and the legal system. See infra Part III.
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the Constitution provides that the President "may submit important
policies relating to diplomacy, national defense, unification and other
matters relating to the national destiny to a national referendum if
he deems it necessary." 10 6 The Court observed the risk that the President could use the Article 72 power to call national referenda not as
a device to ascertain the will of the people but as a political weapon in
partisan conflicts. To prevent such abuses of power, the Court stated,
Article 72 should not be read to allow the President to test the public's confidence in him. Therefore, the Court concluded, Roh's referendum proposal amounted to an attempted abuse of the
constitutional process to enhance his political standing and was in
10 7
violation of the Constitution.
B.

Should Roh Be Removed for His Violations?

After finding that Roh "ha[s] violated the Constitution [and an]
Act[ I in the performance of official duties," as provided under the
impeachment provision of the Constitution, 10 8 the Court addressed
the question whether he should be removed from office. The Court
announced that the appropriate guide for making such determination
is the principle of proportionality (p6bikhy6ngnyang) - whether the
particular legal violation by the public official is serious enough to
justify removal from office. In the impeachment context, the relevant
variables in considering whether removal is proportionate are, the
Court stated, "the gravity of the legal violation" and "the consequences of removal from office."'10 9

There are two main adverse consequences of removing a President from office, the Court noted. The first adverse consequence is
that removal results in cutting short the term of a democratically
elected leader, thereby thwarting the will of the people. The second
adverse consequence is the political turmoil that can be brought
about when the country is left without an administration until a new
President is elected and the work of the administration is interrupted. Therefore, whether a President's conduct in violation of law
warrants his removal should be considered, the Court concluded, in
light of the democratic legitimacy of his tenure and the importance of
continuity in administration. 1 0
The question then was what kind of legal violation is sufficient to
justify effecting such adverse consequences of removing the President. Because the purpose of the impeachment process is to protect
and preserve the Constitution, the Court explained, the gravity of the
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

HONBoP art. 72.
2004Hun-Nal, at 36-38.
HONBOP art. 65, § 1.
2004Hun-Nal, at 44.
Id. at 44-45.
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legal violation has to be considered from the perspective of protecting
the constitutional order, meaning that the relevant question to ask is
how much damage to the existing constitutional order has been inflicted by the particular legal violation. The Court concluded that impeachment and removal are appropriate only when "such steps are
necessary to rehabilitate the damaged constitutional order." 'l
More specifically, the Court equated "constitutional order" with
"free and democratic basic order" (chayuminjuj6k kibonjils). The
"free and democratic basic order," the Court explained, consists of respect for fundamental human rights, separation of powers, independence of judiciary, parliamentary institutions, multi-party system,
and electoral institutions. 1 12 The Court then listed several examples
of acts that directly threaten the free and democratic basic order: acceptance of bribery, corruption, embezzlement, abuse of presidential
power to attack the authority of other branches of the government,
violation of human rights and oppression of citizens through use of
the coercive power of state institutions, use of public office for illegal
1 13
campaigning, and manipulation of election results.
Applying this standard, the Court held that none of the violations by Roh justified removing him from office. 1 14 First, the Court
pointed out that the President's support of the Uri Party, while in
violation of law, did not involve any "active, premeditated scheme" to
use the governmental authority to undermine the democratic process
but was instead merely a statement of support that was incidental to
his answers to reporters regarding his policy outlook. 1 15 Similarly,
the President's defiance facing the National Election Commission's
ruling that he had violated the election law, while inexcusable, was
not serious enough to justify removal, as his conduct did not rise to
the level of attempting to thwart the fundamental liberal democratic
order or of challenging the idea of the rule of law. Finally, the Court
concluded, given the hitherto uncertainty surrounding the proper
scope of the President's power under Article 72 to hold a national referendum and considering the fact that he did not pursue his proposal
after facing opposition, his misconduct in this instance was not a vio1 16
lation serious enough to justify his removal.
111. Id. at 45-46.
112. There is some controversy over the proper way to translate the phrase
"chayuminjuj6k kibonjils." See Hahm, supra note 70, at 269 n.60. The word "chayu,"
when used as an adjective, can be translated as either "free" or "liberal." My decision
to use "free and democratic basic order," as opposed to, say, "fundamental liberal democratic order," should not be taken to imply an endorsement of one reading of the
Korean Constitution over another.
113. 2004Hun-Nal, at 46.
114. Id. at 48.
115. Id. at 47.
116. Id. at 47-48.
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C. Other Grounds for Impeachment: Corruption and
Maladministration
The National Assembly impeached Roh also on the grounds of
"Corruption and Abuse of Power" and "Maladministration." The
Court summarily dismissed both charges. The text of the impeachment provision in the Korean Constitution limits impeachable offenses to violations of "the Constitution or other Acts in the
performance of official duties." 117 Because most of the allegations of
bribery and illegal campaign fundraising involved conduct before Rob
assumed office, the Court dismissed the corruption claims as being
outside the scope of the impeachment provision and thus improper as
a basis for impeachment. 118 As to the maladministration claim, the
Court held that because impeachment was a "legal," not "political,"
procedure, the National Assembly's accusation that Roh neglected his
duties and that his administration lacked direction and created an
uncertain political and economic environment were mere policy disagreements that cannot serve as grounds for impeachment and
should await resolution through the electoral process instead. 11 9
III.
A.

THREE CONSTITUTIONAL THEMES

Courts and ConstitutionalMeaning

During the Clinton impeachment saga, a question that was repeatedly raised was whether President Clinton's misconduct was serious enough to justify his impeachment and conviction, leading to
his removal from office. There were congressional hearings, academic conferences, editorials, and law review articles that addressed
the topic, 120 but once the impeachment process ran its course, we

were arguably at the same level of uncertainty about the meaning of
"high Crimes and Misdemeanors" as we were before Clinton was impeached. Clinton's acquittal in the Senate was not accompanied by
any official statement of the rationale behind the decision other than
the simple fact that there were not enough votes to convict. And
nothing that either house of Congress did with regard to Clinton's
impeachment case has any binding effect on the future Congresses.
117. HONBOP art. 65, § 1.
118. 2004Hun-Nal, at 40-42.
119. Id. at 42-43.
120. See, e.g., Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
(1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 279 (1998);
Akhil Reed Amar, On Impeaching Presidents, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291 (1999); Stephen B. Presser, Would George Washington Have Wanted Bill Clinton Impeached?, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 666 (1999); John 0. McGinnis, Impeachment: The Structural Understanding,67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 650 (1999); Dworkin, supra note 28; Whittington,
supra note 28.
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This is not to say that we start with a blank slate every time
there is a new impeachment attempt. The judiciary is not the only
source of constitutional meaning; other political actors shape the way
we understand the Constitution over time in the political realm, in a
process that Keith Whittington' has dubbed "constitutional construction."12 1 The ways in which each impeachment episode is debated,
understood, remembered, and produces winners and losers in history
can define the terms of the debate in future impeachment disputes.
Nevertheless, it still remains the case that Clinton's acquittal is, at
this point in time, not much more than one of the few data points in
the history of impeachment (or near impeachment) efforts in the
U.S.-after President Andrew Johnson's impeachment and acquittal
in 1868 and President Richard Nixon's resignation in 1974-and its
continuing significance for our impeachment process is yet to be settled and likely will remain so, for at least as long as the Clinton
couple stays in the public spotlight as highly controversial figures.
By contrast, the constitutional law of impeachment in Korea has
gone through an immediate, concrete change as a result of Roh's impeachment. Because of the Constitutional Court's institutional feature of giving reasoned analyses of its decisions, what Korea now has
is an authoritative, binding statement that: the President can be impeached only for violations of law, 12 2 for conduct only while in office, 1 23 and only when the damage he has inflicted on the free and
democratic basic order is so grave that only his removal from office
can repair the damage.' 24 Parts of the standard remain vague, to be
sure, but any future National Assembly contemplating presidential
impeachment will be under a legal obligation to consider the standard as articulated by the Constitutional Court. The Roh impeachment case illustrates that one of the consequences of involving
judicial decisionmaking in the presidential impeachment process is
judicial development of a body of law that defines the terms of debate
on the proper use of the impeachment device and binds future generations accordingly.
B. Law, Politics, and ConstitutionalOrder
One of the perennial debates about impeachment, at least in the
U.S., is whether it is, or should be, a legal or political process. In the
U.S., the topic assumes the form of an interpretive question: What is
the meaning of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors"? 12 5 The most noto121. See generally WHITTINGTON, supra note 28.
122. 2004Hun-Nal, at 43-43.

123. Id. at 40-42.
124. Id. at 45-46.
125. The text provides: "The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.

422

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 53

rious answer to this question is the statement made by Gerald Ford
when he was a member of the House of Representatives: "[An impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history; conviction
results in whatever offense or offenses two-thirds of the other body
considers to be sufficiently serious to require removal of the accused
from office. 1 26 Ford's statement has been frequently criticized for
permitting an essentially limitless power on the part of Congress to
use the impeachment provision as a weapon in partisanship, but its
persistence and controversy reflect the dual nature of the impeachment process in our constitutional practice. If Gerald Ford is at one
end of the law-politics spectrum on the nature of the impeachment
process, at the other end is Raoul Berger, who has argued, while acknowledging that politics is "the nature of the beast," that we should
ask "whether Congress is proceeding within the limits of'high Crimes
and Misdemeanors"' as understood by the Framers of the
27

Constitution. 1

Various commentators have fallen in between the two extremes.
Charles Black wrote that we should treat as impeachable "those offenses, and only those, that a reasonable man might anticipate would
be thought abusive and wrong, without reference to partisanpolitics
or differences of opinion on policy."128 Akhil Amar describes impeachment as "sensibly political as well as legal" where "[p]oliticians
judge other politicians and impose political punishments."' 29 Rich1 30
ard Posner writes that "political impeachments" are inappropriate,
recognizes that "[nlo Presidential impeachment can fail to be suffused with politics,"' 3 1 but argues that popular justice and legal jus-

tice should not be confused. 132 Michael Gerhardt, who argues that
"impeachment is by nature, structure, and design an essentially political process,"' 33 urges "members of Congress to treat their impeachment authority as one of their most important duties and to
undertake political risks for the sake of checking the most serious
kinds of abuses by certain executive and judicial officers.' 34 Surely
there is a problem of definition here-the distinction between law
and politics has been problematized at least since the days of legal
126. 116 CONG. REC. 11,913 (daily ed. April 15, 1970). This quote is frequently
quoted out of context for effect. The full quotation includes the following assessment:
"To remove [the President and Vice President] in midterm .. .would indeed require
crimes of the magnitude of treason and bribery." Id.
127. BERGER, supra note 28, at 102.
128. BLACK, supra note 1, at 32-33 (emphasis added).
129. Amar, supra note 120, at 294.
130. POSNER, supra note 21, at 116.
131. Id. at 111.
132. Id. at 109-20.
133. Michael Gerhardt, The ConstitutionalLimits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 TEx. L. REV. 1, 5 (1989).
134. GERHARDT, supra note 28, at xiii (emphasis added).
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realism-but the debate nonetheless captures the way in which law
and politics are intertwined in the impeachment context.
In its decision, the Constitutional Court of Korea carved out one
position on the question of the nature of the impeachment process.
As noted above, the impeachment provision in the Constitution allows the National Assembly to pass motions only when the public of135
ficial in question has "violated the Constitution or other Acts."
The Court inferred from this provision that the purpose of the impeachment process is to protect the Constitution and to prevent the
abuse of power by members of the executive and judicial branches.
By providing for a mechanism for impeachment and removal from
office of high ranking public officials for violations of law, the Court
noted, the Constitution is making clear that no one is above the law
and that the nation is committed to the rule of law. The Court
pointed out that the Constitution limited grounds for impeachment to
violations of law and designated the Constitutional Court as the ultimate decisionmaker. The Court concluded from such considerations
that the process of impeachment is a legal, not political, process and
that a President can be impeached only on legal, not political,
13 6
grounds.
The Court's syllogism-that the Constitution limits impeachment to legal violations and that impeachment is therefore a legal,
not political, process-seems straightforward, but the apparent simplicity is misleading, as the complexities of the Court's actual position
are obscured by the formulation. First, the Court is not entirely consistent on the question of what is "legal" and what is "political." In a
similar debate in the U.S. about the scope of impeachable offenses,
the possibility of limiting the scope to indictable offenses is frequently
mentioned (and usually rejected). 137 The scope of the "law," and thus
"legal violations" that are potentially grounds for impeachment, are
much broader than that under the Korean Court's definition. The
definition of the "law" the Court gave in its opinion encompasses anything that may be considered the "law," including the Constitution
itself, the body of precedents interpreting the Constitution, domestic
legal provisions, international treaties, and customary international
law.1 38 In its own opinion, however, the Court was not able to sustain such a broad definition of "law."
135. HONBOP art. 65, § 1.
136. 2004Hun-Nal, at 15-16.
137. See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 1, at 33-36;

GERHARDT,

supra note 28, at 103;

POSNER, supra note 21, at 98-100.

138. 2004Hun-Nal, at 17. That a president may be impeached for violating customary international law may seem extraordinary, but it is not so far-fetched once one
considers that Article 6, Section 1 of the Korean Constitution provides that "[tireaties
duly concluded and promulgated under the Constitution and the generally recognized
rules of international law shall have the same effect as the domestic laws of the Republic of Korea."
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Article 66, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the "President shall have the responsibility and duty to safeguard the independence, territorial integrity and continuity of the State and the
Constitution." 139 Article 66, Section 3 states that the "President
shall have the duty to pursue sincerely the peaceful unification of the
homeland." 140 Article 69 requires the President to take the oath and
swear that he "will faithfully execute the duties of the President by
observing the Constitution, defending the State, pursuing the peaceful unification of the homeland, promoting the freedom and welfare of
the people and endeavoring to develop national culture." 14 1 Although, by the Court's own definition, these are "legal" provisions in
the sense that they are in the Constitution, the nature of the enumerated duties makes it difficult to see in what sense applying these provisions involves "legal" as opposed to "political" judgments, and why
the Court should be entrusted with determining whether the President has fulfilled these duties of presidency. At the same time, the
Court's own definition of the "law" and the Court's duty to evaluate
the appropriateness of motions to impeach appear to compel the conclusion that the Court must decide whether these presidential duties
have been fulfilled satisfactorily.
Remarkably, the Court escaped this tight spot by declaring that
some of these provisions are irrelevant for the purposes of impeachment. The Court gave its answer in its consideration of the claim
that Roh should be removed from office for maladministration. The
National Assembly argued that Roh violated Article 66, Section 2 and
violated his oath specified in Article 69 by failing to "execute the duties of the President" and bringing about economic and political instability. 14 2 The Court dismissed this claim. The Court stated that
while the President's Article 66 and Article 69 duties are "constitutional duties," whether they have been fulfilled is not something that
can be determined as a matter of law, and that the proper forum for
such judgment is the political realm. Since Article 65, Section 1 limits grounds for impeachment to violations of the Constitution or other
laws, the Court concluded, the President's failure to fulfill his duties
under Article 66, Section 2 and Article 68 cannot serve as grounds for
impeachment-with one exception. Article 66, Section 2 of the Constitution imposes on the President the duty "to safeguard.., the Constitution." Because whether the President was fulfilling this
particular duty, the Court asserted, was ascertainable through application of the law, failure to fulfill this duty could serve as a ground for
impeachment. 143
139. HONBOP art. 66, § 2.
140. Id. art. 66, § 3.
141. Id. art. 69.
142. 2004Hun-Nal, at 42.

143. Id. at 42-43.
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Thus, from the clause providing that a President may be impeached for "violat[ion] of the Constitution or other Acts," the Court
inferred that the impeachment process is a legal, not political, process, and when it faced the provisions of the Constitution that clearly
seemed to call for political, not legal, judgments, the Court declared
them "political," not "legal," and thus outside the scope of the impeachment process. In other words, no offense is impeachable unless
the judiciary is able to determine that the offense has taken place. If
the alleged offense lies outside the scope of offenses that the judiciary
can identify, then it might as well not exist for the purposes of
impeachment.
An alternative way of drawing the boundaries of impeachable offenses that is consistent with the text of the Korean Constitution is
easy to imagine. Instead of limiting the scope of impeachment to
what is legally ascertainable, the Court could have gone in the other
direction. For instance, because the scope of impeachable offenses is
broader than the scope of questions that can be answered by the judiciary by applying legal standards, the Court could have concluded
that it should defer to the National Assembly on questions that are
not susceptible to resolution through, say, "judicially discoverable
and manageable standards," to borrow from the Baker v. Carr formulation of the political question doctrine. 14 The Court did not take
this path and instead chose to exclude certain reasons from the realm
of permitted grounds for impeachment itself.
Although the Constitutional Court's reasoning thus appears simplistic and even arbitrary at times, the motivation is understandable.
Given that it is charged under the Constitution to adjudicate impeachments, the Court was likely reluctant to yield its authority to be
the final arbiter of impeachment disputes. At the same time, the
Court appeared to have recognized the danger of permitting impeachment on the basis of a President's "failure" to satisfy the constitutional aspiration of "pursuing the peaceful unification of the
homeland, promoting the freedom and welfare of the people and endeavoring to develop national culture" 145 and the near impossibility
of adjudicating the claim that the President's performance falls short
of the ideal outlined in the presidential oath. Because the Court
sought not to weaken its constitutional status to be the ultimate decisionmaker, the Court narrowed the scope of impeachable offenses
only to those that it considered to be within its competence to manage, instead of deciding the proper scope of impeachable offenses first
and then narrowing the Court's own role in it. The narrowing of the
scope of impeachable offenses, then, may be one consequence of
144. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
145. HONBOP art. 69.
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designating a judicial body as the ultimate decisionmaker in the impeachment process.
The complexity of the Court's position on the law-politics distinction does not end there. Even if it is the case that only straightforward "legal" violations can lead to impeachment, it does not
necessarily follow that answering the question whether a democratically elected President should be removed from his office midterm
calls for legal judgment. As seen above, the Court's ultimate decision-that Roh was in violation of law but that the violations were
not serious enough to warrant removal-involved judgment that was
more than the narrower question of whether he violated any law.
That is, because not every violation of law is considered serious
enough to warrant impeachment, the Court had to judge not only
whether there had been a legal violation, but also whether it was serious enough to justify removal. In the American context, it is frequently noted that one of the reasons the impeachment process is
inescapably political is that the "law" does not supply answers to the
kinds of questions the Constitutional Court of Korea was calling "legal"-such as what kinds of violations are grave enough to warrant
removal. 146
The National Assembly recognized this, and it argued in its
briefs that judging the seriousness of misconduct involved the kind of
judgment that the Constitutional Court was not suited to make. The
National Assembly thus suggested the following division of labor.
The National Assembly, which is the democratically elected body,
should be the final arbiter of whether the particular legal violations
at issue by the President are grounds for impeachment and removal.
The role of the Constitutional Court should be limited to deciding, the
National Assembly argued, whether the passage of the impeachment
motion followed the correct legal procedure and whether the alleged
conduct by the President involved legal violations. Whether particular legal violations justify the National Assembly's attempt to remove
the President from his office, the Assembly argued, should be left to
14 7
the Assembly's discretion.
The Assembly's reading was rejected by the Constitutional Court
in favor of a broader reading of the Court's power. As noted above,
the Court inferred from the text and structure of the Constitution
that impeachment is strictly a legal, not political, process. From the
Court's view that impeachment is a legal proceeding, the Court drew
out the following standard of review. The Court stated that in deciding whether the President should be removed, it could consider only
those facts alleged by the National Assembly to constitute grounds
for impeachment. However, the Court made clear that it was not con146.
147.

See, e.g., Amar, supra note 120, at 294-95.
2004Hun-Nal, at 7-8.
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strained by the Assembly's judgment in any other way. The Court
stated that there is no deference to the Assembly in determining
whether there has been such a legal violation. The Court also stated
that, given the facts alleged by the Assembly, the Court may, de novo,
find legal grounds other than those identified by the Assembly as
grounds for impeachment. In other words, the Court confined the Assembly's role at this stage to delimiting the range of conduct by the
President the Court may consider. As to whether such conduct in fact
was in violation of law, whether it constituted grounds for impeachment and removal, and which grounds, were entirely up to the
8
14

Court.

The question remains, in what sense is judgment of the seriousness of the President's offense "legal," as opposed to "political," judgment? The Court was in need of a standard that could serve two
purposes. First, the standard had to supply a way of ranking legal
violations in terms of their seriousness, from trivial to impeachable.
In other words, the Court needed a way to discuss a hierarchy of values in order to assess the gravity of the President's legal violations.
Second, the standard had to be a "legal" standard the application of
which properly belonged, or appeared to belong, to the Constitutional
Court.
The Court found its solution in the concept of the "constitutional
order." As discussed above, the Court held that impeachment and
removal of a President are appropriate only when "such steps are
necessary to rehabilitate the damaged constitutional order," and the
Court explained that by "constitutional order" it meant "free and
democratic basic order." 149 By invoking the concept of the constitutional order in judging whether a President was impeachable, the
Court took the impeachability decision outside the realm of politics.
However, in doing so, the Court also had to reach outside the Constitution and appeal to something more fundamental than the Constitution itself-the foundational concepts that underlie the Constitution.
It is debatable, of course, whether the free and democratic basic order
that the Court invokes is to be found "inside," "outside," or in the
"penumbras" of the Constitution. The important point is to note the
way in which the Constitutional Court of Korea managed its way
around the intersection of law and politics in the impeachment context. The legal status of "the constitutional order," the question of
who should determine what it consists of, and whether similar invocations of fundamental ideals would be available to, or likely in, other
countries facing their own impeachment disputes are questions that,
while beyond the scope of this article, should receive further study.
148. Id. at 7.
149. Id. at 45-46.
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C. Judicial Supremacy, Popular Constitutionalism,and the Rule
of Law
Another striking feature of the impeachment case from the perspective of American constitutional law is the Constitutional Court's
unequivocal statement of the doctrine of judicial supremacy when it
comes to constitutional interpretation. "Judicial supremacy" in constitutional law refers to the idea that the courts have the final say on
the meaning of the Constitution and that no other body-not the legislative branch, not the executive branch, and not "the people" at
large-can have a valid interpretation of the Constitution that is inconsistent with the judiciary's view of what the Constitution
means. 150 The idea that the Constitutional Court is the ultimate authority on the meaning of the Constitution is not new in Korea and
has been generally accepted since the Court decided its first case in
1989.151

Neither is it unfamiliar to the American audience, given

that this view of constitutional interpretation is widely accepted in
the United States. However, judicial supremacy has been criticized
recently in the works of several constitutional scholars, most prominently by Larry Kramer 152 and Mark Tushnet,15 3 who put forward
an alternative conception they call "popular constitutionalism" (or
"populist constitutional law"), which Kramer defines as a constitutional system in which the people assume "active and ongoing control
1 54
over the interpretation and enforcement of constitutional law."

The impeachment case in Korea, and the role of the Constitutional
Court in recent Korean history, present another way of looking at
this familiar debate.
The doctrine of judicial supremacy appears in an unequivocal
manner in two places in the Court's opinion. The first place is in the
Court's discussion of the standard of review of the Assembly's motion
to impeach. As discussed above, there were at least two different
ways to allocate the impeachment power between the National Assembly and the Constitutional Court. The Court could have assigned
itself the narrow role (which is still broader than the role assigned to
American courts in similar contexts) of determining whether the im150. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 7 (1999);
Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARv. L. REV. 4, 6 (2000) (defining

"judicial supremacy" as "the notion that judges have the last word when it comes to
constitutional interpretation and that their decisions determine the meaning of the
Constitution for everyone").
151. 89Hun-Mall7 (Jul. 3, 1989).
152. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).

153. TUSHNET, supra note 150, at 177.
154. Larry D. Kramer, PopularConstitutionalism,Circa2004, 92 CAL. L. REV. 959,
959 (2004); see also TUSHNET, supra note 150, at 182 ("Populist constitutional law...
treats constitutional law as not something in the hands of lawyers and judges but in
the hands of the people themselves.").
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peachment vote followed the proper procedures in the National Assembly and whether there was a violation of "the Constitution or
other Acts," as specified by Article 65, Section 1 of the Constitution. 155 The National Assembly urged the Court to accept the narrow
role, 156 but the Court opted for a broader reading of its role and limited the National Assembly's role
to identifying which facts the Court
15 7
could consider in its decision.
The second time the doctrine of judicial supremacy is asserted is
in the Court's rebuke of Roh's attitude towards the National Election
Commission's decision that he was in violation of law. The Constitutional Court pointed out that the President had the duty to uphold
the Constitution, but it is clear that the Constitution the President is
to uphold is the version that has been endorsed by the Constitutional
Court only. As discussed above, the Court thought it was of no moment that Roh questioned the legitimacy of the law as a "relic from
the country's authoritarian past." This is because the President's
duty to follow the law, the Court asserted, includes the duty to follow
even the law he considers unconstitutional unless and until the Constitutional Court pronounces the law unconstitutional.15 8 Although
the President is free to hold and express his own views about reforming the law, how he does so is of paramount importance, the
Court added, and it is not appropriate for him to raise questions
about the law that he himself was found to have violated. Such stringent restrictions on the President's ability to discuss constitutionality
of laws may raise the eyebrows of American constitutional scholars.
However, there are several factors that drive the Constitutional
Court of Korea toward a strong position of judicial supremacy.
First, the effect of having a specialized court for constitutional
matters on the Court's attitude toward other branches of the government should not be ignored as a factor. Victor Ferreres Comella recently argued that constitutional courts specializing in constitutional
questions have an incentive to be "activist."' 5 9 The reason for this is
that it is difficult for a constitutional court to justify its existence as
an institution if it regularly defers to the legislature and denies constitutional challenges.160 Putting aside the question of whether this
is normatively desirable, the Constitutional Court of Korea's aggressive stance may be seen as an institutional feature that is typical of
constitutional courts generally.
155. HONBOP art. 65, § 1.
156. 2004Hun-Nal, at 7-8.
157. Id. at 7.
158. Id. at 34-35.
159. Victor Ferreres Comella, The Consequences of CentralizingConstitutionalReview in a Special Court: Some Thoughts on JudicialActivism, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1705,
1732-36 (2004).

160. Id. at 1728.
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Second, the history of modern Korea is a history of authoritarianism of Syngman Rhee, Park Chung Hee, and Chun Doo Hwan from
the end of the Korean War in 1953 to the constitutional amendments
in 1987.161 There was no independent judiciary during this period,

and when a judicial body, in a few instances, went against the President's wishes, it was either quickly overruled or dismantled. 162 The
1987 constitutional amendments that gave birth to the current constitution was a byproduct of a conscious political liberalization effort,
backed by popular demand, that sought to repudiate this model of
politics.

16 3

Because the main image of governance that the country

rejected in the reform process was that of a lawless, oppressive, allpowerful dictator, one possible way to control the President was
through the judiciary. At the time of the amendment, however, very
few people anticipated the Constitutional Court to play a strong role
in restraining the governmental exercise of power. 164 Yet the Court
has performed well beyond everyone's expectation in curbing the governmental authority since then. 165 It appears then that the Court
has been able to draw on the strong sentiment of the population that
the executive branch is not always to be trusted and that its power
should be restrained by the rule of law. From this historical and political perspective, a statement from the Constitutional Court that
concedes to the President the power to speak against the Constitutional Court's reading of the Constitution or challenge a legal provision that is in effect could appear to be an alarming retreat to the
authoritarian era.
Third, the institutional structure of the Constitutional Court itself may enable it to be aggressive without being vulnerable to the
charge that it is not politically accountable. The composition of the
Constitutional Court itself-three chosen by the Chief Justice of the
161. For good overviews, see BRUCE CUMINGS, KOREA'S PLACE IN THE SUN: A MODERN HISTORY 337-93 (1997); DAVID I. STEINBERG, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATION AND-SOCIAL CHANGE 48-68 (1989); ROBERT E. BEDESKI, THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOuTiH KOREA: REFORM AND RECONSTITUTION IN THE SIXTH REPUBLIC
UNDER ROH TAE Woo, 1987-1992 (1994); SUNHYUK KIM, THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN KOREA: THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY (2000).
162. GINSBURG, supra note 70, at 208-13; DAE-KYu YOON, LAW AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN SOUTH KOREA 150-99 (1990); Roh, supra note 9, at 196-97; Dae-kyu Yoon,
New Developments in Korean Constitutionalism:Changes and Prospects, 4 PAC. RIM
L. & POL'Y J. 395, 400-04 (1995); Kyong Whan Ahn, The Influence of American Constitutionalism on South Korea, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 71 (1997).
163. STEINBERG, supra note 161, at 59-66; KIM, supra note 161, at 77-104; GINSBURG, supra note 70, at 218; Hahm, supra note 71, at 389; West & Baker, supra note
70, at 241-44.
164. See, e.g., Hahm, supra note 71, at 395; James J. West & Dae-kyu Yoon, The
ConstitutionalCourt of the Republic of Korea: Transforming the Jurisprudenceof Vortex?, 40 AM. J. COMp. L. 73, 115 (1992).
165. See, e.g., GINSBURG, supra note 70, at 221-26; Hahm, supra note 71, at 395;

Kyu Ho Youm, Press Freedom and JudicialReview in South Korea, 30 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 1 (1994).
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Supreme Court, three by the President, and three by the National
Assembly-gives the appearance that the Constitutional Court is designed to be a place where different perspectives of the government
are represented. 16 6 In addition, although the justices of the Constitutional Court are not elected, each justice serves only for a six-year
term. The term is renewable, but the norm in the recent past has
been for the justices to serve for single terms only. The Constitution
itself is much easier to amend than it is in, say, the United States, as
a supermajority in the National Assembly combined with a national
referendum can amend the Constitution. 1 6 7 Some have argued recently that similar structural elements in European nations may
make the institution of judicial supremacy more palatable from the
perspective of popular constitutionalism. 168 A similar dynamic may
be at play in Korea.
Finally, the impeachment case has turned out to be a perfect vehicle for flexing judicial muscles and enhancing the Court's power
and status without offending Korean democratic sensibilities, as the
National Assembly's decision to impeach was overwhelmingly unpopular, and the Court's decision was applauded nationwide. 169 It is difficult to imagine the Court invoking the vague concept of
"constitutional order" while ignoring the citizens' strong disapproval
of the National Assembly's behavior and the results of the General
Election, which gave a majority of the Assembly seats to the very
party that Roh was impeached for supporting. In other words, behind the Court's statement of judicial supremacy is its confidence
that its decision is strongly supported by a large segment of the population. In this vein, one can only speculate how the Court would have
come out had the National Assembly been able to turn the public sentiment against Roh after the impeachment or had the public shown
its support for the parties that impeached Roh in the April General
Election.
CONCLUSION

The Roh impeachment episode, as the first case in which a president impeached by a legislature has been reinstated by a judicial
166. HONBOP art. 111.
167. Id. art. 130.
168. KRAMER, supra note 152, at 250; see also KOMMERS, supra note 71, at 56 ("Despite its democratic legitimacy, or perhaps because of it, the [German] Constitutional
Court has developed into a fiercely independent institution and has struck down large
numbers of statutory provisions and administrative regulations."); Comella, supra
note 159, at 1733.
169. James Brooke, ConstitutionalCourt Reinstates South Korea's Impeached President, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2004; Anthony Faiola, Court Rejects S. Korean President's
Impeachment, WASH. POST, May 14, 2004; Barbara Demick, South Korean President
Is Reinstated: A Court Rules That His Impeachment Was Unjustified. Meanwhile,
New NationalAssembly is Set to Take Office, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 2004.
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body, is a landmark event not only in modern Korean history but also
in the history of modern constitutionalism generally. The historical
importance of the case is far-reaching and multi-faceted, but in this
article I limited my discussion to only those aspects that strike me as
most significant as a scholar of comparative constitutional law. However, because impeachment cases are rare, and every case is different, it is difficult to draw firm comparative lessons, and many of the
observations made in this article necessarily remain suggestive and
impressionistic. If nothing else, the Roh impeachment case prompts
us to rethink the consensus in the United States about the proper
role of the judiciary in presidential impeachment disputes and to consider whether the firm American position on the question is due to
factors that are specific to American constitutional tradition, to reflect on how "clear" the position is as a matter of "political theory" as
Judge Posner would have it,170 and ask what difference it makes to
have the Senate, as opposed to the Supreme Court, have the final
word on the impeachment question.

170. POSNER, supra note 21, at 130.

